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Abstract:Named Data Networking (NDN) is based on the principle of Content-Centric Networking 
(CCN) that aims to overcome the weaknesses of the current host-based Internet architecture. Like 
traditional networks, it is identified that NDN is also vulnerable to many security threats including 
denial-of-service (DoS) or distributed DoS (DDoS) and might offer avenues for new DoS/DDoS 
attacks. DDoS attacks can be triggered in NDN to exhaust resources within an NDN router or the 
content producer(s). This survey paper focuses on different types of possible distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attacks; in particular, we address Interest flooding, where an adversary with limited 
resources can implement this attack and significantly impact thenetwork performance and their 
proposed countermeasures. 
Keywords:Named Data Networking, Interest flooding, denial-of-service. 
 
1. Introduction 
The current Internet is facing unprecedented challenges in 
many aspects. It has become extremely difficult to support 
the ever increasing demands for security, performance, 
reliability, social content distribution, mobility, etc. [1]. A 
number of research efforts have sprung up in recent years to 
design the next generation Internet architecture to address 
these challenges. One such new architecture is Named Data 
Networking (NDN) [2] that aims to overcome the 
weaknesses of the current host-based communication 
architecture. NDN based on the principle of Content-Centric 
Networking (CCN) [3], where content rather than hosts 
occupies the central role in the communications architecture. 
NDN explicitly names content (data) instead of physical 
locations (hosts or network interfaces). NDN is one of five 
research projects funded by the U.S. National Science 
Foundation (NSF) under its Future Internet Architecture 
(FIA) Program [1]. 
Security and privacy are two important requirements of 
NDN. In the past few years, denial-of-service (DoS) or 
distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks have grown significantly 
both in size and frequency, and it remains among the most 
critical threats on the current Internet. Therefore, NDN must 
provide better security against these attacks. NDN does not 
use host-based addressing to established the connection for 
communication. NDN consumers request desired data by 
sending Interest packets by names, and the network returns 
the requested Data packets following the path of Interests. It 
makes NDN resilience to traditional DDoS attacks, but a new 
type of DDoS attack can be triggered in NDN to exhaust 
resources within an NDN router or the content producer(s). 
A malicious user can attack the network by sending a huge 
number of Interest packets with spoofed names. These huge 
number of Interest consumes the bandwidth of the network 
and exhaust a router's memory. This type of attack is term as 
Interest Flooding Attack (IFA) and this paper exclusively 
focus on this problem and their proposed countermeasures. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section II presents the 
overview of NDN architecture. Section III describes Interest 
flooding attack. Section IV analyzes the related work. 
Finally, Section V concludes the paper. 
2. NDN Overview 
NDN is an entirely new architecture whose motivation is the 
architectural mismatch of today‘s Internet architecture and 
its usage. However, its design principles are derived from the 
successes of today‘s Internet [4]. 
The hourglass architecture of Internet centers on a 
universal network layer (i.e., IP), which implements the 
minimal functionality necessary for global interconnectivity. 
The thin waist as can be seen in Figure 1 was the key enabler 
of the explosive growth of the internet by allowing both 
lower and upper layer technologies to innovate 
independently. The NDN architecture keeps the same 
hourglass shape as shown in Figure 1, but changes the thin 
waist by using data directly rather than its location. 
 
Figure1: Internet and NDN Hourglass Architectures 
 
Communication in NDN uses two types of packets: 
Interest and Data as shown in Figure 2. A consumer asks for 
content by sending the Interest packet, which carries a name 
that identifies the desired data, overall available 
connectivities. 
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Figure2: Packets in the NDN Architecture 
 
Any node having data that satisfies it, a Data packet is 
sent back, which carries both the name and the content of the 
data, together with a signature by the producer‘s key as 
shown in Figure 2. This Data packet travels in reverse the 
path taken by the Interest to get back to the requesting 
consumer. 
According to [2], each NDN router maintains following 
three data structures for Interest packet and Data packet 
forwarding. 
i) Content Store (CS)- Cache of Data packets to serve 
subsequent Interest packets requesting the same 
content. 
ii) Forward Information Base (FIB)- Routing table of 
name prefixes and it guides Interests toward data 
producers. It is almost similar to an IP FIB except it 
allows for a ranked list of outgoing faces rather than 
a single best next-hop [5]. 
iii) Pending Interest Table (PIT)- Table of outstanding 
(pending) Interest, recording the Interest‘s name, 
incoming interface(s) and outgoing interface(s). A 
PIT entry is created for each requested name. 
When a router receives an Interest packet which is not in its 
cache and there are no pending Interests for the same in its 
PIT, the Interest is added to the PIT and according to FIB it 
forwards the Interest to the next hop(s). For each forwarded 
Interest, a router stores state information, like the Interest 
name and the interface on which it arrived, in its PIT. If the 
PIT already contains the name, the router collapses the 
present and any subsequent Interests and stores only the 
interface upon which it was received. If and when content is 
returned, the router forwards it out on all incoming Interest 
interfaces and removes the corresponding PIT entry and 
caches the Data in the CS [6]. As Interest and Data packets 
do not carry any host or interface IP addresses, Interest 
packets are forwarded toward data producers based on their 
names and Data packets are forwarded to consumers based 




NDN names are opaque to the network (that is, routers 
do not know the meaning of a name) and specific to 
applications, which allows the naming schemes to 
evolve independently from the network. But they share 
the common characteristics; hierarchical structure and 
explicitly delimited components. For example, a video 
produced by YouTube may have the name 
/youtube/videos/ndn.mpg, where / specifies a boundary 
between name components (it is not part of the name). 
Thishierarchical structure as shown in Figure 3 is useful 
for applications to represent relationships between 
pieces of data. 
 
 
Figure3: Hierarchical Naming 
 
B. Security 
Current IP networks security is based on where and how 
the data is obtained, that is, clients must retrieve content 
directly from the original source to trust it. NDN builds 
security into data itself by requiring data producers to 
sign cryptographically every piece of Data with its name 
[2]. 
C. Routing and Forwarding 
NDN routes and forwards packets based on names.This 
eradicates fours IP addresses problems: address space 
exhaustion, Network Address Translation (NAT) 
traversal, mobility, and address management [4]. There 
is no Address exhaustion problem since the namespace 
is limitless. There is no NAT traversal problem since a 
host does not need to expose its address in order to offer 
content. Like IP, which needs changing addresses, 
mobility is not the issue in NDN because data names 
remain the same during the communication. Finally, 
address assignment and management is no longer 
required in local networks. 
NDN Routing can be done similar to today‘s IP routing. 
Instead of announcing IP prefixes, NDN router announces 
name prefixes that cover the data that the router is willing to 
serve. Routers simply treat names as sequences of opaque 
components and do component-wise longest prefix match of 
the name in a packet against the FIB. For example, 
/youtube/videos/ndn.mpg may match both /youtube/videos 
and /youtube in the FIB, but /youtube/videos is the longest 
prefix match. Conventional routing protocols, such as Open 
Shortest Path First (OSPF) and Border Gateway Protocol 
(BGP), can be adapted to route on name prefixes. However, 
research is going on Named-data Link State Routing (NLSR) 
protocol [7] and development of efficient data structures and 
algorithms for fast lookup of variable-length, hierarchical 
names [4]. 
3. Interest Flooding Attack 
An adversary can take advantage of two features unique to 
NDN, namely CS and PIT, to mount DDoS attacks [8]. We 
focus on attacks that exploit the PIT, which keeps track of 
the unsatisfied Interest packets traversing a router, as well as 
their arrival interfaces. The adversary uses a large set of 
zombies, which are possibly geographically distributed, to 
generate a large number of Interest packets with spoofed 
name as shown in Figure 4 aiming to (1) overwhelm PIT 
table in routers, preventing them from handling legitimate 
Interests and (2) swamp the target content producers [9]. 
Once the PIT is full,all subsequent incoming interests are 
dropped as there is no memory available to create PIT entries 
for new incoming interests. Since the names are spoofed, no 
Interest packets will be satisfied by the content. These 
ADBU-Journal of Engineering Technology 
 
 47 AJET, ISSN: 2348-7305, Volume 4(1), 2016 
 
Interest packets will stay in the PIT for as much time as 
possible, which will certainly exhaust memory and 




Figure4: An Interest packet with spoofed name: a legitimate 
prefix concatenated with a forged suffix 
 
Figure 5 shows an example of Interest flooding attack 
where attacker starts Interest flooding attack and the PIT of 
the NDN router on the Interest forwarding path is filled with 
attacker‘s Interest. As a result, when a legitimate consumer 
request the content, the router on the path of Interest flooding 
drops the Interest since the PIT is full and it cannot create 
PIT entries for new incoming Interests. 
 
 
Figure5: Example of Interest flooding attack 
 
As observed in [9], based on the type of content 
requested, there are three types of Interest flooding attack: 
i) Existing or Static Content- The impact of this attack is 
quite narrow since content caching of NDN provides a 
built-in countermeasure. If several zombies from 
different paths generate a large number of Interest 
packets to attack a producer. After the initial attack, the 
content settles in all intervening routers‘ caches. 
Subsequent Interest packets for the same content cannot 
propagate to the producer(s) since they are satisfied by 
cached copies. 
ii) Dynamically Generated Content- Since requested 
content is dynamic, all Interest packets are routed to 
content producer(s), thus consuming bandwidth and 
router PIT table. The result of this attack is that the 
producer may getoverloaded with malicious Interests, 
and unable to handle requests from other legitimate 
consumers. The router which is closer to the producer 
has the greater effect on its PIT. 
iii) Non-existent Content- In this attack zombies generate 
distinct and unsatisfiable Interests for a non-existent 
content, which means these names cannot match any 
FIB entry in routers. Therefore, these Interest packets 
are duplicated and propagated throughout the entire 
network until they reach the hosts at the edge of the 
network. On one hand, duplicating such a great amount 
of Interest packets cost a lot of computing resources; on 
the contrary, without responding Data packets, these 
Interest packets will stay in the PIT for as much time as 
possible, which will certainly exhaust memory and 
computing resources on routers, degrading routers‘ 
performance, or even making them crashed. 
4. Related Works 
In this section, we present various proposed countermeasures 
of Interest flooding attack by researchers and analyze those 
countermeasures. We aim to provide readers a better 
understanding of Interest flooding attacks and its 
countermeasures. Gasti et al. [9] performed analysis of 
NDN‘s resilience to DDoS attacks and discussed two types 
of attacks with their effects and potential countermeasures 
(Router Statistics and Push-back Mechanisms). However, the 
paper does not analyze DDoS attacks and their 
countermeasures. Afanasyev et al. [10] proposed three 
mitigation algorithms (token bucket with per-interface 
fairness, satisfaction-based Interest acceptance, and 
satisfaction-based pushback) that allow routers to exploit 
their state information to stop Interest flooding attack. 
Among these three mitigation algorithms, satisfaction-based 
pushback mechanism could effectively shut down attackers 
and ensure that almost all the Interests from legitimate users 
are satisfied. This work uses a simple and static attackers 
model, and it does not consider intermediate router‘s cache 
and always forwards all the way to the producer [8]. 
Compagno et al. [11] proposed a framework, named 
Poseidon, for mitigation of local and distributed Interest 
flooding attack for non-existing contents. Authors simulated 
a simple attackers model, and their countermeasure has been 
able to use around 80 - 90 % of the available bandwidth in 
the most cases during the attacks. Dai et al. [13] proposed 
Interest traceback as a countermeasure against DDoS attacks 
by generating spoofed Data packets to satisfy the long-
unsatisfied Interest packets in the PIT by tracing back to the 
Interest originators. According to [8], this method is not 
proactive, makes overhead in the network by increasing 
made spoofed contents. Another shortcoming is that it 
assumes long-unsatisfied Interests in the PIT is adversary 
and others unsatisfied Interest are normal usages. Due to 
which the router drops the incoming packet rate of the 
interface that has too many long-unsatisfied Interest packets. 
As a result of this independent decision, the probability of 
legitimate Interests being forwarded decreases from that 
interface. Choi et al. [14] provided an overview of threats of 
Interest flooding attack for non-existent contents on NDN. 
Authors simulated and explained the effect of Interest 
flooding DDoS attacks on the quality of services. However, 
they do not analyze DDoSattacks and their countermeasures. 
Karami et al. [8] introduced an intelligent hybrid algorithm 
for proactive detection of DDoS attacks and adaptive 
reaction for mitigating. In the detection phase, a combination 
of multi-objective evolutionary optimization and Radial 
Basis Function (RBF) neural network has been applied. After 
constructing the intelligent hybrid classifier (predictor) 
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module, an adaptive reaction mechanism by enforcing 
explicit limitations against adversaries was proposed to 
mitigate potential DDoS attacks in NDN. 
In Table I, we summarize all countermeasures of Interest 
flooding attack described in this section. 
5.  Conclusion 
NDN which is one of the promising architecture for future 
internet, tries to provide better security and privacy support 
than the current host based internet. Though traditional 
DDoS attacks in NDN does not have much effect, its more 
advanced architecture introduces novel attack opportunities. 
In this paper, we have presented a specific instance of DDoS 
attacks namely, Interest flooding. We have provided a 
snapshot of the current state of the art of research in Interest 
flooding attack. We discussed existing solutions and 
analyzed those solutions. Perpetrators exploit NDNs Interest 
packet forwarding rule to send out Interest packets with 
spoofed names and makes these interest packets as attacking 
packets. We investigated that the victims of Interest flooding 
attack is not only the hosts, but also the PIT within routers. 
However, we find that the PIT is the largest target. In Interest 
flooding attack, a great amount of Interest packets resides in 
the routers which exhaust memory and computing resources 
on routers, degrading routers‘ performance, or even making 
them crashed. As NDN is a new Internet architecture 
proposal, there are very limited research work going for 
mitigation of Interest flooding attack. Hence, there is a need 
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